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I. INTRODUCTION
As we reflect upon the influence of the Supreme Court's summary
judgment trilogy,' we should recall Elie Wiesel's warning: "[W]e must
not see any person as an abstraction. Instead, we must see in every
person a universe with its own secrets, with its own treasures, with its
own sources of anguish and with some measure of triumph." 2 In this
Article, I suggest that the Supreme Court's opinion in Matsushita
Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.3 is particularly
influential because it has encouraged the federal courts to approach
summary judgment by treating human beings as abstractions. Zenith
enabled those courts to prejudge factual issues based on a presumption
about human behavior that is: (1) profound, (2) pervasive, and
(3) problematic. 4
1. The trilogy refers to three Supreme Court opinions regarding summary judgment issued in
the spring of 1986: Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
2. Elie Wiesel. Foreword to NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBURG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, at ix (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 1992).
3. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
4. In her path-breaking work, Professor Suja Thomas has brilliantly demonstrated that the
Supreme Court's approach to summary judgment constitutes an unconstitutional usurpation of the
fact-finding role of the jury. in violation of the Seventh Amendment. Suja A. Thomas. Why
Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REv. 139. 143 (2007): Suja A. Thomas, Why
Summary Judgment is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA
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This Article begins by showing that Zenith promulgates an
evidentiary presumption that is profound because that presumption
incorporates a judicial predetermination about the essence of human
nature, human behavior, and human motivation.5 In particular, the
Supreme Court in Zenith invites the federal courts to see human beings
as abstractions by promulgating a strong presumption that persons and
businesses make purely rational choices with a singular intent to
maximize their wealth. Part III then demonstrates that Zenith's
rationality presumption has become pervasive. 6 Federal courts have
transported the presumption of human rationality into procedural stages
before summary judgment and into substantive areas beyond antitrust.7
In Part TV, this Article shows that Zenith's judicial rationality
presumption is problematic because the view of human nature on which
it is based has been discredited in the twenty-five years since the
trilogy.8
The overwhelming evidence from behavioral science confirms Elie
Wiesel's admonition: we must not see any person as an abstraction.
Human behavior is not so predictably rational as to justify any judicial
presumption of rationality-let alone one that would prevent a jury
from resolving quintessential fact questions about human behavior,
motives, and credibility. Finally, Part V concludes by suggesting that
the problematic behavioral model of rational wealth-maximization has
permeated the scholarship regarding summary judgment itself.9
II. ZENITH PROMULGATES A BEHAVIORAL PRESUMPTION THAT IS
PROFOUND
In his outstanding article in this Symposium issue, Professor Stempel
refines the scholarship demonstrating that the Supreme Court's trilogy
has empowered federal judges to approach summary judgment with
"cognitive illiberalism." 10 Professor Stempel and others define that
concept as the "failure to recognize the connections between
L. REv. 1667, 1671-72 (2000). In this Article. I attempt to build on Professor Thomas's
scholarship by suggesting the genius of the framers in presenting to the jury the role of resolving
questions of fact, particularly those involving nuances and multi-layered questions about human
behavior, lies in the jury's unique ability to resolve complex issues that go to the heart of what it
means to be human.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part III (A)-(B).
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
10. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate
Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 651, 654-55 (2012).
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perceptions of societal risk and contested visions of the ideal society."I I
Under this concept, we are unable or unwilling to perceive the
possibility that persons with different cultural experiences perceive
things differently.12  Professor Stempel broadens contemporary
understanding of cognitive illiberalism: not only are judges unable or
unwilling to accept the possibility that people with different cultural
experiences would perceive the same set of facts in a different way, but
Professor Stempel also astutely shows that judges are blind to the
degree to which similarly situated persons belonging to the same
demographic groups can reasonably disagree about a set of facts. 13
This cognitive illiberalism14 is a particular problem in the context of
the judicial resolution of summary-judgment motions. When judges
resolve a dispute on a motion for summary judgment, they must draw
on their own experience and common sense to drive decision-making.
The problem with asking judges to rely on their experience and
common sense is that experience shapes our common sense: persons of
different backgrounds, and even similar backgrounds as Professor
Stempel shows,15 see things-literally-very differently.16 Judges do
I1. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils
of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REv. 837, 838 (2009); see also Dan M. Kahan, The
Cognitively Illiberal State. 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117-18 (2007) (discussing cognitive
illiberalism).
12. Professor Donald Braman explains how cultural cognition can shape our view of the
"reasonable person" standard under the law:
When deliberating about what course of action is just, individuals will rarely have
direct access to the answers themselves. Instead, they must judge whether the stories
in which the information is embedded are plausible and are consistent with one
another. And when interpreting a legal standard, they must consider which of the
norms implicit in the standard are relevant, given the facts as they know them. All the
empirical evidence we have suggests that persons will do this through interlocking
social and cognitive mechanisms that cause them to rely on a culturally contingent
situation sense; an implicit knowledge of how the material and social world works.
Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1455, 1468 (2010).
13. Stempel, supra note 10. at 644-45: see also Braman, supra note 12, at 1463 (expounding
that even when jurors are confronted by the same set of facts, their interpretation of those facts is
colored by their cultural heritage).
14. Professor Stempel uses the term "cognitive illberalism" more broadly than just blindness
to the differing views of those in different demographic views, and hence. he eschews the term
"cognitive illiberalism" in favor of terms such as the "false certainty bias" or "consensus bias,"
terms that he claims do not "rely so heavily on race, gender, and ethnic differences or use a word
that has become problematic because of years of imprecise political rhetoric." Stempel. supra
note 10, at 635. This Article likewise uses "cognitive illiberalism" in the broader sense employed
by Professor Stempel.
15. Stempel, supra note 10. at 644-45.
16. RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 67-68 (2008) (arguing that judges' cultural
backgrounds and political leanings subconsciously affect how they view a case).
HeinOnline  -- 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 596 2011-2012
Summary Pre-Judgment
not always recognize this problem and are prone to cognitive
illiberalism, or a false certainty bias in which they neglect to account for
the ways that their individual experience shapes their common sense.17
The problem of cognitive illiberalism, which Professor Stempel
persuasively explores, however, may be even more profound than we
can imagine. Zenith creates a judicial bias in favor of a particular
understanding of human behavior, human motivation, and human
nature: that persons and businesses predictably engage in rational,
wealth-maximizing behavior.18 In Zenith, the Supreme Court held that
summary judgment was proper in favor of Japanese manufacturers and
distributors of consumer electronic products on the claim that they
conspired to set predatory prices in the American market with an intent
to monopolize that market. 19 The plaintiffs argued that the Japanese
firms conspired to fix and maintain artificially high prices in Japan
while cutting prices in American markets; the Japanese firms would
then use their monopoly profits from the Japanese market to fund a
concerted campaign to price predatorily and drive the other businesses
from the American market.20
In support of their claim, the plaintiffs produced an expert who
showed how the plaintiffs were harmed. First, the plaintiffs' expert
explained
that the price-raising scheme in Japan resulted in lower consumption
of [the Japanese firms'] goods in that country, and the exporting of
more of [the Japanese firms'] goods to this country, than would have
occurred had prices in Japan been at the competitive level. Increasing
exports to this country resulted in depressed prices here, which
harmed [the plaintiffs].2 1
Second, the plaintiffs' expert showed that the Japanese firms
"exchanged confidential proprietary information and entered into
agreements such as the five-company rule with the goal of avoiding
17. Dan M. Kahan et al.. supra note 11. at 842-43. The false certainty bias is consistent with
Kahneman's path-breaking research demonstrating that persons are prone to overconfidence and
that they harbor an illusion of their own validity. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST
AND SLOW 209-12 (2011) (illustrating cognitive illusions in context of stress test for army
leadership positions).
18. See generally GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3-14
(1976) (defining the economic model of human behavior).
19. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574. 598 (1986). A horizontal
conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing is a per se violation of the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2006) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal.").
20. Zenith, 475 U.S. at 584.
21. Id. at 601-02 (White, J., dissenting).
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intragroup competition in the United States market." 22  The expert
opined that the Japanese firms' restrictions on intragroup competition
caused the plaintiffs to lose business that they would not have lost had
the Japanese firms competed with one another.23
Nonetheless, the district court held that summary judgment was
proper for the Japanese firms because "some portions of the evidence
suggested that petitioners conspired in ways that did not injure
respondents," and "the evidence that bore directly on the alleged price-
cutting conspiracy did not rebut the more plausible inference that
petitioners were cutting prices to compete in the American market, and
not to monopolize it." 24  The Third Circuit reversed because in the
court's view, the plaintiffs produced both direct and indirect evidence of
an illicit agreement to fix prices.25
The Supreme Court, however, held that the district judge properly
entered summary judgment for the defendants. 26 The Court reasoned
that if the defendants had "no rational economic motive to conspire, and
if their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations,
[then] the conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy." 27
The Court further declared that "expert opinion evidence of below-cost
pricing has little probative value in comparison with economic factors
that suggest . . . that such conduct is irrational."28 In particular, "if the
factual context renders [the plaintiffs] claim implausible-if the claim
is one that simply makes no economic sense-[the plaintiff] must come
forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than
would otherwise be necessary." 29 According to the Court, "lack of
[economic] motive bears on the range of permissible conclusions" that
can be found by a jury from "ambiguous" evidence. 30 The district court
therefore properly entered summary judgment because no reasonable
jury could infer from merely circumstantial evidence that the defendants
engaged in irrational economic behavior.
In reaching its result, the Supreme Court presumed that businesses
naturally engage in rational wealth-maximizing behavior. 31 The Court
22. Id. at 602.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 579 (majority opinion).
25. Id. at 580-82.
26. Id. at 598.
27. Id. at 596-97.
28. Id. at 594 n.19.
29. Id. at 587.
30. Id. at 596.
31. See id at 595 ("[A]s presumably rational businesses, petitioners had every incentive not to
598 [Vol. 43
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next concluded that no rational wealth-maximizing institution would
enter into a long-term agreement to set below-cost pricing because no
institution would expect to recover substantial short-term losses with
uncertain long-term gains or would trust their coconspirators to
maintain their agreement. 32 In support of this declaration, the Court
cited Robert Bork's textbook on antitrust laws, The Antitrust Paradox:
A Policy at War with Itself 33 Robert Bork, and the Chicago School of
Law and Economics more generally, argued that predatory pricing was
an irrational strategy for trying to gain or maintain a monopoly and,
therefore, companies are unlikely to adopt predatory pricing in
practice. 34 The Court accepted Bork's extra-judicial view of economic
behavior and found that the contrary view offered by the plaintiffs'
expert was not worthy of jury consideration. 35
The Supreme Court's presumption that no rational entity would
engage in predatory-pricing behavior alleged in the case also led the
Court to erect a novel evidentiary standard: In response to the summary-
judgment motion, the plaintiffs adduced "direct evidence" of an
agreement by the defendants to fix maximum prices in Japan, as well as
evidence of their actual below-cost pricing practices and success in the
U.S. market.36 In fact, the plaintiffs had garnered admissions from the
defendants-direct evidence-of their agreement to set prices in the
Japanese market.37  According to the Court, however, that direct
engage in the conduct with which they are charged. for its likely effect would be to generate
losses for petitioners with no corresponding gains.").
32. Id. at 597.
33. Id. at 589 (citing ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 144 (1978)).
34. BORK. supra note 33, at 144-45. Robert Bork did not argue that predatory pricing was
impossible, however, but stressed that it was unlikely: "[T]here seems to be nothing inherently
impossible in the theory [of predatory pricing]. The issue is the probability of the occurrence of
predation and the means available for detecting it." Id. at 145: see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981) (similarly
explaining that predatory pricing is unlikely under a traditional economic model of behavior);
Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON.
THEORY 280, 280-81 (1982) (same); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 186 (1976) (same).
35. Zenith, 475 U.S. at 594 n.19.
36. Id. at 594-95.
37. The plaintiffs offered evidence that the Japanese firms entered into "check price
agreements: formal agreements arranged in cooperation with Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry that fixed minimum prices for products exported to the American market." Id.
at 581. The plaintiffs also offered evidence that the defendants distributed their products in the
United States according to a "five company rule": each Japanese producer was allowed to sell to
only five American distributors. Id. The Supreme Court held that this evidence was not direct
evidence of antitrust violation for three reasons: First, the antitrust laws do not regulate the
competitive conditions of other nations' economies; second, the plaintiffs could not recover
2012] 599
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evidence of an agreement to fix prices in Japan was only "circumstantial
evidence" of an agreement to set predatory prices in the U.S. market.38
In the Court's construct, therefore, the plaintiffs had offered only
circumstantial evidence of an agreement to engage in predatory pricing
in the American market. The Court then concluded that no reasonable
jury could infer from this circumstantial evidence that the defendant
engaged in irrational economic behavior.39 After Zenith, plaintiffs
seeking to avoid summary judgment on their claims that defendants
conspired to set predatory prices with an intent to monopolize must
present more than circumstantial evidence.
Although the Supreme Court's opinion addressed the evidentiary
burden incumbent on the nonmoving party at summary judgment, its
result was driven by its fundamental understanding of human behavior.
The Court's reasoning proceeded as follows:
(1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires courts to enter
summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute of material fact such
that judgment becomes proper as a matter of law;
(2) The plaintiffs as the nonmoving party have the burden of
presenting admissible evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of
material fact for trial;
(3) To meet that burden, the plaintiffs must provide evidence from
which a reasonable jury could find in its favor by the burden of proof
at trial, generally a preponderance of the evidence;
(4) The plaintiffs presented circumstantial evidence that the
defendants had intentionally entered into an agreement to set
predatory prices in the U.S. market;
(5) Circumstantial evidence is evidence from which there are at least
two reasonable inferences;
(6) The circumstantial evidence provided by plaintiffs gives rise to
two reasonable inferences: (a) a jury could infer from the plaintiffs'
circumstantial evidence that the defendants unlawfully conspired to set
predatory prices with an intent to monopolize the U.S. market; or (b) a
jury could infer from the plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence that the
defendants lawfully engaged in separate, competitive behavior;
damages for a conspiracy to charge higher-than-competitive market prices in American markets,
even though this would violate the antitrust laws. because the plaintiffs would not have suffered
any injury; and third, the plaintiffs could not recover for a conspiracy to impose non-price
restraints that have the effect of either raising market price or limiting output because these
restrictions, though harmful to competition. actually benefit competitors by making supra-
competitive pricing more attractive. Id. at 582-83.
38. Id. at 595-96.
39. Id. at 598.
600 [Vol. 43
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(7) No reasonable jury could infer from circumstantial evidence that
the defendants entered into a conspiracy with an intent to monopolize
the American market;
(8) The inference that the defendants conspired to set predatory prices
and monopolize the American market is implausible;
(9) That behavior is implausible because the defendants had no
rational economic motive to conspire;
(10) If the defendants entered into a conspiracy to set predatory prices
with an intent to monopolize the American market, then they would
have engaged in economically irrational behavior;
(11) Persons and firms do not engage in behavior that is economically
irrational;
(12) To the contrary, persons and firms make rational choices with an
intent to maximize their wealth; and
(13) Human beings by nature make purely rational choices intended to
maximize their wealth.
Accordingly, the Court's interpretation of Rule 56 rests ultimately upon
its profound view of human behavior.
TH1. ZEAITH'S PROFOUND PRESUMPTION HAS BECOME PERVASIVE
Zenith encourages the use of summary judgment when the plaintiff
produces only circumstantial evidence that the defendant engaged in
behavior that a federal judge determines would be irrational under an
abstract, neoclassical economic, wealth-maximizing model. Since
Zenith, federal courts have employed this presumption about human
behavior to prevent juries from inferring culpable behavior from merely
circumstantial evidence at procedural stages before summary judgment
and in substantive areas beyond antitrust law.
A. The Profound Presumption has been Extended Beyond Summary
Judgment
The Supreme Court is so enamored with the law-and-economics
model of human behavior that it has extended this theory to the pleading
stage. Indeed, Professor Linda Mullinex, in her excellent article
published in this Symposium Issue, concludes that Zenith has been
"swallowed" by the Court's more recent decisions regarding pleading
standards. 40 In both Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly41 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,42 the Court, in requiring plausibility in pleadings, concluded that
40. Linda S. Mullinex, The 25th Anniversary of the Summary Judgment Trilogy: Much Ado
About Very Little, 43 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 561, 565 (2012).
41. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
42. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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allegations based purely on circumstantial evidence are insufficient to
state a plausible claim when that claim asserts that the defendants
engaged in irrational behavior. 43
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
In Twombly, the Supreme Court held that an agreement to carve up
territories and prevent new entrants would be irrational. The plaintiff
sued Bell Atlantic Corp. and other local telephone-line operators and
internet-service providers, claiming that they maintained regional
monopolies in violation of the antitrust laws by engaging in parallel
conduct44 in their respective regional territories to prevent other
telephone companies from entering the telephone market.45 Parallel
conduct can suggest either that the defendants are acting independently
and thus lawfully, or that the conduct is a product of a horizontal
agreement to fix prices and thus is unlawful.
On the basis of the pleadings alone, the Supreme Court held that no
jury could infer from circumstantial evidence of conscious parallelism
that the defendants engaged in an unlawful agreement. According to
the Court, this circumstantial evidence "falls short" of plausibly
suggesting a conspiracy. 46  The Court asserted that conscious
43. Several scholars have noted the parallels between the summary judgment trilogy and
Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g.. Hillel Y. Levin. 1qbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex
Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143, 145-54 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary
Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 15, 24-28 (2010).
44. Professor Michael K. Vaska explains in Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining
the Boundary, why plaintiffs rely on an allegation of conscious parallelism as circumstantial
evidence of a conspiracy to fix prices:
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act has eliminated most overt price-fixing
arrangements. In order to avoid sanctions under this law, firms wishing to engage in
collusive, anticompetitive practices are forced to enter into secret agreements to fix
prices. The detection of these covert agreements has become the central focus of
section I enforcement. Direct evidence of such agreements is difficult to obtain,
however, and courts must often rely on indirect or circumstantial evidence of
conspiracies to fix prices. Frequently, an important factor in establishing the existence
of such a conspiracy is similar conduct by rival firms that suggests they are attempting
to set prices or carve up the market for a particular product. Such 'conscious
parallelism' by itself does not constitute concerted action in violation of the Sherman
Act, however, and courts have disagreed over what additional evidence ('plus factors')
must be produced in order to permit a trier of fact to infer the existence of a price-
fixing agreement.
Michael K. Vaska, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the Boundary. 52 U. CHI.
L. REv. 508, 508 (1985).
45. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553.
46. The Supreme Court put to rest the "no set of facts" pleading system under Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In Twombly. the Court said that the "no set of facts"
language under Conley should not be read literally because a literal reading would allow a
602 [Vol. 43
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parallelism is more likely a reaction of rational firms in a concentrated
market that recognize their shared economic interests and
interdependence with respect to price and output decisions. 47 In other
words, even at the pleading stage, the Court held that federal courts
should presume that businesses behave rationally.
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that any intent to discriminate
against people based on their religion and national origin would be
irrational in light of "more" rational motives to foster national security.
The FBI detailed the plaintiff in a maximum security prison after
identifying the plaintiff as a person of "high interest" in connection with
immigration law violations.48  The plaintiff alleged that the FBI
designated him a person of "high interest" on account of his race,
religion, or national origin.49  According to the complaint, the FBI
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of an
investigation of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, that the FBI
held these men in highly restrictive conditions, and that the FBI
Director and Attorney General knew of and condoned this process as a
matter of policy, solely on account of the plaintiff s race.50
The Supreme Court held that the inference that the defendants
intended to discriminate against Arab Muslim men was implausible. 5 1
The Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs allegations were consistent
with a policy of detaining persons on account of their race, religion, or
national origin, but, according to the Court, the acts "were likely lawful
and justified by . . . nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were
illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections
to those who committed terrorist acts." 52 Faced with precise allegations
of defendants' unlawful intent to discriminate, the Court again rejected
conclusory statement of a claim to survive a motion to dismiss where it merely leaves open the
possibility that later facts will be revealed to support recovery. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-63.
47. Id. at 553-54, 564-70. Justice Stevens in dissent argued that an inference of an agreement
to set prices is indeed plausible: "Many years ago a truly great economist perceptively observed
that '[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.' Id.
at 591 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting A. Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, in 39 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 55 (R. Hutchins & M. Adler
eds., 1952)).
48. Ashcroft v. lqbal. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943-44 (2009).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1950 52.
52. Id. at 1951.
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the plaintiffs allegations based on the Court's assumption that such an
intent would be irrational and thus likely did not exist.
B. The Profound Presumption Has Been Extended Beyond Antitrust
Not surprisingly, the presumption of human rationality has had a
dramatic impact on antitrust jurisprudence since Zenith.53  But the
impact has spread. Professor Spencer Weber Waller has perceptively
likened the neoclassical Chicago School of Law and Economics' model
of human behavior to a virus, "captur[ing] the dynamics of how the
Chicago School has spread by penetrating a new area of the law,
replicating itself, and transmitting itself to new host bodies of law or
legal jurisdictions." 54 He writes that "Law and Economics has . . .
spread from its origins in antitrust law to a wide variety of legal fields,
so that virtually any area of U.S. law can be analyzed from a law and
economics perspective."55 In this Article, I focus on the extension by
the federal courts of the rationality presumption into two specific areas
where liability requires a showing of intentional conduct: intentional
discrimination claims and securities fraud claims.
1. Intentional Discrimination Claims
Federal courts have extended Zenith's profound rationality
presumption to cases involving intentional discrimination based on
"irrational" characteristics, such as race, gender, disability, age, and
national origin. As Professor Ann McGinley has concluded based on
her extensive research of federal court decisions: "In response to the
trilogy, lower courts have granted summary judgment in cases where
there exist questions of fact concerning the employer's motive, thereby
denying to employment discrimination plaintiffs their 'day in court'
historically provided by the American model of litigation."56
In American Nurses Association v. linois,57 the Seventh Circuit built
the foundation for the development of a rationality bias in
discrimination cases. In that case, the court warned that plaintiffs will
53. See Maurice E. Stucke, Behavior and Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-
First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 514-15 (2005) (arguing that Richard Posner's and
Robert Bork's works on antitrust analysis continue to influence antitrust decisions and antitrust
economists).
54. Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 367, 369
(2009).
55. Id. at 368.
56. Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VIl and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203, 207 (1993).
57. 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
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"lose eventually on summary judgment" if they are only able to present
circumstantial evidence supporting claims of intentional gender
discrimination.58 There, a class of female employees alleged that their
employer, the State of Illinois, intentionally discriminated against them
because of their gender by paying them less than male employees who
were doing comparable jobs.59 The plaintiffs based their claims on
undisputed evidence that the State knew of significant wage disparities
between men and women, continued to pay workers according to those
disparities, and did nothing to correct the disparities.
Nonetheless, in an opinion written by Judge Richard Posner, the court
concluded that the State's failure to achieve comparable worth would
not permit an inference that the State intentionally discriminated against
its female employees because of their gender. To the contrary, the court
presumed that any such failure would be attributable to "passive
acceptance of a market-determined disparity in wages." 60 Significantly,
Judge Posner accepted the notion that the defendant's failure to achieve
comparable worth could have been motivated either by an irrational
desire to treat men better than women or by a rational desire to
maximize wealth by paying men and women market wages. 61 Yet, the
court declared that if all the plaintiffs could present was circumstantial
evidence of the State's irrational desire to favor men over women, then
they had "no case." 62
The court thus presumed that employers invariably make rational
employment choices that are intended to maximize wealth, and that
employers do not engage in irrational employment decisions based on
characteristics such as gender. That presumption led the court to reject
the plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination. Put
another way, circumstantial evidence, which gives rise to two equally
plausible inferences, was not sufficient to rebut the court's presumption
that the defendants were motivated by rational wealth-maximization
rather than gender discrimination. As a result, plaintiffs wishing to
avoid summary judgment must provide direct evidence of a defendant's
intent to discriminate.
Similarly, in Troupe v. May Department Stores, Co.,63 the Seventh
Circuit upheld the federal district court's grant of summary judgment
58. Id. at 730.
59. Id. at 718-19.
60. Id. at 720.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 723.
63. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
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against the alleged victim of employment discrimination on the basis of
her pregnancy. The plaintiff presented evidence that she was terminated
immediately after being told by her supervisor that he did not think she
would return to work after she had given birth.64 Although it insisted
that plaintiff need not present direct evidence of discriminatory intent to
avoid summary judgment, the court nonetheless rejected the plaintiffs
evidence of that intent on the ground that it was inadequate
circumstantial evidence.65  The court reasoned that the undisputed
evidence that Troupe's supervisor fired her because of his belief that she
would not return to work after her pregnancy could give rise to two
inferences: (1) the inference that her supervisor's motive for termination
was her pregnancy; and (2) the inference that the supervisor terminated
her not because of her pregnancy, but because he did not expect her to
return to work after her pregnancy. 66
Despite the fact that the plaintiff had presented circumstantial
evidence giving rise to an inference that the employer terminated her
because of her pregnancy, the court concluded that she presented "no
evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer that she was a
victim of pregnancy discrimination." 67 Instead, the court presumed that
the employer was motivated by only rational choices to maximize
wealth, determining that the evidence showed that the plaintiff was fired
"not because she was pregnant but because she cost the company more
than she was worth to it." 68
Similarly, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court considered factual
allegations that FBI officers, under the knowing direction of the
Attorney General and the FBI Director, purposely detained thousands of
Arab men, including the plaintiff, after September 11, 2001, because of
their race, religion, or national origin.69 The majority acknowledged
that these allegations were "confinement" with an unlawful intent to
discriminate against the plaintiff.70 Nonetheless, the Court declared:
"[G]iven more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this
purpose."71 Rather, the Court found that the only plausible explanation
64. Id. at 735-36.
65. Id. at 738.
66. Id. at 737-738.
67. Id. at 738.
68. Id. For an insightful analysis of how Judge Posner's law-and-economics presumptions
dictated the result in Troupe, see Ann C. McGingley & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Condescending
Contradictions: Richard Posner's Pragmatism and Pregnancy Discrimination, 46 FLA. L. REV.
193 (1994).
69. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
70. Id.
7 1. Id.
606 [Vol. 43
HeinOnline  -- 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 606 2011-2012
2012] Summary Pre-Judgment 607
for the defendants' conduct was their desire to "keep suspected
terrorists in the most secure conditions available . . . ."72 In rejecting
the complaint's specific allegations of the defendants' unlawful
purpose, the Court simply presumed that this purpose was
implausible. 73  The Court offered no support for its presumption that
discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin would be
implausible. The Court merely concluded that it would be irrational for
the defendants to confine the plaintiff for any reason other than their
belief that he posed a threat.74 Armed with its presumption that the
defendants would not rationally intend to discriminate against the
plaintiff because of race, religion, or national origin, the Court even
rejected detailed allegations of that intent at the pleading stage. 75
The presumption of rationality also has led federal courts to preclude
jury consideration of disability-discrimination cases. 76 In The Law and
Economics of Disability Accommodations, Professor Michael Stein
reported that because of the federal courts' "propensity" to use
summary judgment, 93% of Title I disability-discrimination cases are
resolved in favor of defendants. 77  After conducting a thorough
empirical study of cases, Professor Ruth Coker concluded that the
72. Id. at 1952.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Justice Souter explained in dissent:
lqbal alleges that after the September 11 attacks the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) 'arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men.' ... that many of these
men were designated by high-ranking FBT officials as being 'of high interest,'. . ., and
that in many cases, including Iqbal's, this designation was made 'because of the race,
religion, and national origin of the detainees, and not because of any evidence of the
detainees' involvement in supporting terrorist activity,' . . . . The complaint further
alleges that Ashcroft was the 'principal architect of the policies and practices
challenged,' . . .. and that Mueller 'was instrumental in the adoption. promulgation,
and implementation of the policies and practices challenged,' . . . . According to the
complaint, Ashcroft and Mueller 'knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed to subject [Iqbal] to these conditions of confinement as a matter of policy,
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate
penological interest.' ... The complaint thus alleges, at a bare minimum, that Ashcroft
and Mueller knew of and condoned the discriminatory policy their subordinates carried
out. Actually, the complaint goes further in alleging that Ashcroft and Muller [sic]
affirmatively acted to create the discriminatory detention policy. If these factual
allegations are true. Ashcroft and Mueller were, at the very least, aware of the
discriminatory policy being implemented and deliberately indifferent to it.
Id at 1958-59 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
76. Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment,
100 YALE L.J. 73, 118-19 (1990); McGinley. supra note 56, at 203-06.
77. Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE
L.J. 79, 92 & n.74 (2003).
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inability of plaintiffs to succeed in cases involving disability
discrimination is because "[clourts are abusing the summary judgment
device by refusing to send normative factual questions" to juries.78
Professor Stein has suggested that courts abuse summary judgment in
part by assessing an employer's decision not to make reasonable
accommodations for a disabled employee by presuming that the
employer only makes wealth-maximizing decisions in an efficient labor
market.79
The extension of the presumption of rationality to discrimination
claims is particularly troubling because those cases commonly rest on
circumstantial as opposed to direct evidence. If allegations of
discriminatory intent based on circumstantial evidence are inadequate to
state a claim, then victims will be forced to adduce direct evidence of
that intent at the pleading stage. Yet, because we cannot read minds,
direct evidence of a defendant's mental state is extremely rare.80 That
requires evidence of an actual admission by the defendant under oath or
perhaps testimony of a witness based on personal knowledge. This
direct evidence, if it exists at all, will be difficult to unearth during
discovery and virtually impossible to unearth before filing. As a result,
meritorious claims will be prematurely dismissed.8i If, as the Supreme
Court said in Jqbal, circumstantial evidence is not enough to "nudge" 82
a claim from conceivable to plausible, then many victims of intentional
discrimination will not be able to get to a jury. 83
2. Securities Fraud Claims
Similarly, in securities fraud litigation, federal judges have found that
no reasonable jury could infer from circumstantial evidence that persons
harbored an intent to deceive investors into purchasing securities
78. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act. A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101 (1999).
79. Stein, supra note 77, at 123-29.
80. McGinley. supra note 56, at 214.
81. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 125 26
(2011). "[C]ases that are most vulnerable to dismissal for having thin pleadings are ones that rely
on state of mind allegations, which are the heart of most civil rights and private discrimination
claims." Id. at 159.
82. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
83. In her outstanding article, The Vanishing Plaintiff Professor Brooke D. Coleman shows
how summary judgment works to the unique disadvantage of marginalized victims of racial or
gender discrimination. Brooke D. Coleman. The Vanishing Plaintiff 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1908359.
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because of the judicial presumption that fraud is economically
irrational.84
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, plaintiffs
must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind."8 5 The required
state of mind is scienter, which is recklessness or intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud. 86 In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., the Supreme Court interpreted "strong inference" to mean that a
securities fraud complaint will survive dismissal only if "a reasonable
person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts
alleged,"87 and that courts must "take into account plausible opposing
inferences."88 This weighing process enables federal courts to discount
the kind of circumstantial evidence of scienter that would otherwise be
sufficient to meet the plaintiff s burden of proof at trial.
Before the Supreme Court introduced the "plausible opposing
inference" standard in Tellabs,89 scienter could be inferred from
circumstantial evidence that the defendant had a motive and an
opportunity to engage in fraud and had access to information that
discussed the fraud or concerned the company's core operations.90
Since Tellabs, some federal courts have discounted circumstantial
evidence of scienter.91 Even though federal courts have continued to
84. In securities fraud cases, similar to intentional discrimination cases, judicial behavior
suggests that judges themselves are boundedly rational. Professors Stephen M. Bainbridge and
G. Mitu Gulati have catalogued some of the flawed decision-making heuristics and mental
shortcuts that judges employ as a substitute for analyzing the complexity of cases when deciding
securities fraud suits. They explain that as a substitute for an analysis of "materiality," judges
rely on doctrines derived from heuristics such as puffery. bespeaks caution, zero price change,
and trivial matters. They find that judges rely on doctrinal heuristics that substitute for analysis
of whether the defendant likely acted with scienter such as fraud by hindsight, internal forecasts,
whether something sounds in fraud, and unusual insider stock sales. Last, they find that judges
rely on heuristics that substitute for analysis of whether the defendant had a duty to disclose
information such as routine forecasts and extreme departures. Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu
Gulati, How do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does Boundedly): Rules of
Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 118-36 (2002).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2006).
86. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976); see also Konkol v. Diebold,
Inc.. 590 F.3d 390. 396 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that recklessness is sufficient).
87. 551 U.S. 308. 324 (2007).
88. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309. 1324 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
89. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323.
90. See J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.. THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 1.05(4)(e)
(3d ed. 2010) (discussing the methods of alleging scienter in securities fraud litigation).
91. One federal court forthrightly stated:
If a plaintiff cannot provide direct evidence of scienter, he may nevertheless
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acknowledge that allegations of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to
create a "strong inference" of scienter, and have even reiterated that
recklessness is enough to satisfy the pleading standard, some courts in
their application have found that the inference of scienter is less likely
than virtually any other nonculpable mental state, including negligence,
ignorance, motive to improve the business, and belief that undisclosed
information was not material.92 According to these courts, it is
"unthinkable" that defendants would commit fraud and subject
themselves to the expense and notoriety of a securities fraud jury trial.93
In Durgin v. Mon, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants knew that representations regarding certain loans were with
recourse as opposed to nonrecourse because the loans made up 70% of
the company's net worth and because the defendants signed guarantees
to that effect. 94 But the Eleventh Circuit held that the inference of
scienter was not as compelling as an inference that the defendants acted
with inexcusable neglect. 95 The court wanted the plaintiffs to allege
direct evidence of fraud, for example, that the defendants had told
someone that the loan was not nonrecourse. 96
Similarly, in Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharmaceuticals Inc., 97 the
plaintiffs alleged that Inspire, a manufacturer of an experimental drug
(and "one of the company's flagship products") to treat dry-eye disease,
misstated the results of its clinical trials. The Fourth Circuit held that
the plaintiffs did not allege a strong inference of scienter because the
drug that was the subject of the misstatements was so essential to the
company's success that "[i]t is improbable that Inspire would stake its
existence on a drug and a clinical trial that the company thought was
doomed to failure. Plaintiffs' inference of fraud . . . is thus not even
plausible, much less convincing." 98
establish the requisite mental element circumstantially, either by alleging that the
fraud was in the interest of the defendants. . . . or by other 'circumstances
indicating conscious behavior by the defendant;' . . . where the fraud is shown to
be irrational however, the circumstantial evidence must be stronger ....
In re First Chi. Corp. Sec. Litig., 769 F. Supp. 1444, 1455 (N.D. 111. 1991) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
92. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access Barriers to Remedies for
Securities Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 56-58 (2012) (collecting cases).
93. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex Brown & Sons. Inc.. 132 F.3d 1017. 1035 (4th Cir. 1997).
94. 415 F. App'x 161. 166 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (nonprecedential decision).
95. Id. at 167.
96. Id. at 165.
97. 549 F.3d 618, 621 22 (4th Cir. 2008).
98. Id. at 627.
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In Curry v. Hansen Medical, Inc., as well, the plaintiffs sued Hansen
Medical Inc., claiming that during the class period, the company
improperly recognized revenue on twenty-four of the fifty-nine medical
robotic systems sold, which made up "the bulk of [the company's]
revenue." 99 The plaintiffs insisted that the defendants knew, must have
known, or were reckless in not knowing that the revenue recognitions
were false because: (1) the fraud involved twenty-four out of fifty-nine
of the company's most important transactions-the company's core
operations; (2) the defendants conducted two equity offerings during the
fraud to raise capital while the stock was inflated, suggesting that they
had motive and opportunity to commit fraud; and (3) all these
allegations were corroborated by twelve confidential witnesses. The
court, however, discounted all these allegations because according to
the court, "while this might be suggestive of willful ignorance on
Defendants' part, the argument is entirely circumstantial and does not
support a strong inference of scienter."loo
IV. THE PROFOUND AND PERVASIVE PRESUMPTION ABOUT HUMAN
BEHAVIOR IS PROBLEMATIC
In the twenty-five years since the trilogy, Zenith's profound and
pervasive presumption about human nature has been discredited.101
Social science research, including neuroscience, psychology, behavioral
economics, and hedonics, has established that persons and businesses do
not always engage in rational wealth-maximizing behavior. Because
human behavior is not predictably rational, the judicial presumption that
defendants engage in rational economic behavior is misplaced. That
presumption has been specifically undermined in antitrust,
discrimination, and securities fraud cases.102
A. Persons and Businesses Do Not Predictably Choose to Maximize
Wealth
The premise underlying Zenith that entities engage in rational wealth-
maximizing behavior is descriptive rather than normative.103 The
99. Curry v. Hansen Med. Inc., No. 5:09-cv-05094-JF (HRL), 2011 WL 3741238, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 25. 2011).
100. Id. at *5.
101. See infra Part IV(A).
102. See infra Part IV(B)-(D).
103. Maurice E. Stucke has carefully tracked the evolution of the Chicago School of Law and
Economics and the adherents of the neo-classical economic, wealth-maximizing model that
shows that: "[R]ational choice theory long ago abandoned any pretensions of being a normative
theory ... the Law and Economics' remaining currency is as a descriptive theory . . . ." Stucke,
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Supreme Court and lower federal courts presume that parties engage in
rational wealth-maximization as an aid to determine the likelihood that
a certain alleged behavior occurred in a particular case. Because the
courts presume that the likelihood that a defendant engaged in irrational
behavior is slim, they require heightened proof of that behavior. The
viability of the presumption thus rests upon its predictability.104 If
defendants do not in fact typically engage in rational, wealth-
maximizing behavior, then it would be improper and inefficient to
presume that they do so for evidentiary purposes. Indeed, even if a
defendant's motives are nuanced or mixed, the presumption that
behavior is invariably or purely "rational" would be improper.
The presumption that persons or businesses engage in rational,
wealth-maximizing behavior can no longer be justified as a reliable
predictor of actual behavior. The predominant behavioral science
research demonstrates that "the rational choice model of human
motivation was at best grossly incomplete, and at worst, simply
wrong." 05 Building on research from neuroscience, psychology, and
sociology, behavioral economists have discovered that individual
choices are not purely rational. To the contrary, individual choices are
"bounded"-they are driven by limited information-processing abilities,
systemic information-processing biases, mistaken information
processing, and by an irrational reliance on the behavior of others
within a community. 106 In other words, persons suffer from bounded
rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.
supra note 53, at 526.
104. Legal presumptions often arise because: (1) public policy inclines courts to favor one
contention by giving it the benefit of a presumption; (2) direct proof is rendered difficult, and a
presumption corrects an imbalance resulting from one party's superior access to proof: or (3)
proof of one fact renders the inference of another fact so probable that courts save time presuming
the truth of the inference until it is disproved. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence §§ 201, 202 (2008).
Most presumptions come into existence because of probability-the proof of one fact renders the
existence of another so probable that judges save time by assuming the truth of the second fact.
See, e.g., Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 751-52 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting
plaintiffs probability argument as vague and unsupported by empirical evidence, unlike the
fraud-on-the-market theory. which was so supported): see also Ross v. Bank S.. N.A., 885 F.2d
723, 738 (11th Cir. 1989) (Hill, J., concurring) (noting many courts presume a plaintiffs reliance
based on the fraud-on-the-market theory).
105. Stucke, supra note 53, at 514 n.4 (citing Charles R.P. Pouncy, The Rational Rogue:
Neoclassical Economic Ideology in the Regulation of the Financial Professional, 26 VT. L. REV.
263, 302 (2002)).
106. Behavioral science has also entered the mainstream. See, e.g.. DAN ARIELY.
PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); ORI
BRAFMAN & ROM BRAFMAN, SWAY: THE TRRESISTIBLE PULL OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (2008);
CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONs, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA: HOW OUR INTUITIONS
DECEIVE US (2009): CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON. MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY
ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS (2007).
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1. Bounded Rationality
In their seminal articles, Professors Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tverskyl 07 report the compelling evidence that human beings employ
cognitive heuristics or information processing short-cuts to assign
probabilities to uncertain results from their choices. Rather than make
choices based on whether the alternatives would increase or decrease
their net wealth, persons actually evaluate the alternatives only within a
tight contextual framework.
The empirical evidence amassed by Kahneman and Tversky gave rise
to Prospect Theory, which states that human beings do not engage in
unadorned, rational wealth-maximization; rather, they make choices
based on the manner in which their particular choices are framed.108
For example, persons are more likely to make risky choices to prevent
losing something of value than they are to make risky choices to gain
something of the same value. 109 Put simply, the owner of property
values the property owned more than a potential buyer values that same
property because the owner is faced with the prospect of losing
something already owned, while the buyer is faced with the prospect of
gaining something not yet owned. The actual choices that humans
make to buy or sell property cannot be explained purely by rational
wealth-maximization. Persons are also irrational in their belief that they
are endowed with certain possessions and therefore will assign more
value to an object that they already have then they would to the same
object that they have not yet received.1 10
107. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) [hereinafter Tverksy & Kahneman. Judgment under
Uncertainty]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
108. Tversky & Kahneman. Judgment under Uncertainty. supra note 107, at 1130-31; Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. 211
SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
109. People are loss averse: they are more motivated by the prospect of a loss than by a gain.
Nava Ashraf et al., Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist, in EXOTIC PREFERENCES: BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND HUMAN MOTIVATION 87, 90 91 (Loewenstein ed., 2007); RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS 7 (2008): Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalmeman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference-Dependent Model, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 143, 150 (Kahneman &
Tversky eds., 2000).
110. "Contrary to the traditional assumption in economics that preferences are fixed in the
short-term, the endowment effect indicates that preferences can change rapidly and systematically
because of changes in an individual's transient asset position." Leaf Van Boven et al.,
Mispredicting the Endowment Effect: Underestimation of Owners' Selling Prices by Buyers'
Agents. in EXOTIC PREFERENCES: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HUMAN MOTIVATION. supra
note 109, at 328, 328.
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Moreover, the model of rationality is flawed because of the empirical
evidence that humans in fact are irrational in their over-valuation of
retaining the status quo;' irrational in their assessment of the
probability that an event will occur by reference to their own recent
experiences;11 2 irrational in their reliance on the way others (including
advertisers) frame a choice;11 3 irrational in their belief that the way in
which an object or an event is displayed (including by advertisers)
mirrors the reality of that event or object; and, irrational in their belief
that they are more likely to experience good fortune than the average
person.114
2. Bounded Willpower
Persons not only are prone to these heuristic biases in their decision-
making, they are often incapable of making some choices that they
know to be rational and wealth-maximizing. Humans simply lack the
willpower to reject irrational choices; for instance, they will pay more in
taxes, for example, to enable them to continue to make the knowingly
self-destructive choice to continue smoking. Additionally, emotion
plays a large role in behavior as well. Professor George Lowenstein
argues that emotions are not only goals of behavior (i.e., earning and
spending money to make one happy), but that emotions also "exert a
more immediate influence" on behavior.11 5 He reports that
[p]eople often act against their self-interest in full knowledge that they
are doing so; they experience a feeling of being 'out of control.' This .
. . phenomenon [is attributable to] the operation of 'visceral factors,'
111. The fact that people often demand much more to give up an object than they are willing
to pay to get is known as the endowment effect or status-quo bias. Daniel Kahneman et al., The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES,
supra note 109. at 159. 159-60.
112. The availability heuristic posits that the probability assessments that people make are
frequently based upon how easily we can think of examples. BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 5
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein have found that this individual
heuristic interacts with social mechanisms to generate "availability cascades," in which individual
responses make these perceptions appear increasingly plausible through their rising availability in
public discourse and may result in mass delusions that may last indefinitely. See generally Timur
Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Controlling Availability Cascades. in BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS, supra, at 374 (explaining availability cascades and collective availability errors).
113. Framing effects "refer to the fact that the very same choice can be perceived as a gain or
a loss based purely on its formal presentation." Edward J. McCaffery et al.. Framing the Jury:
Cognitive Perspective on Pain and Suffering Awards, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS. supra
note 112, at 259, 262.
114. Stucke, supra note 53. at 527-28.
115. George Lowenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior. in ExOTIC
PREFERENCES: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HUMAN MOTIVATION. supra note 109, at 523.
523 24.
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which include drive states such as hunger, thirst and sexual desire,
moods and emotions, physical pain, and craving for a drug one is
addicted to.116
These visceral factors then "crowd out virtually all goals other than that
of mitigating the visceral factor," and "people underweigh, or even
ignore, visceral factors that they will experience in the future, have
experienced in the past, or that are experienced by other people."117
3. Bounded Self-interest
In a similar vein, evidence adduced by behavioral psychologists and
game theorists also shows that persons reject rational choices where
they believe them to be unfair.118 For example, when considering
settlement, litigants are interested in not just purely wealth-
maximization, but also consider other values like fairness when
deciding whether to accept a settlement offer. 119 As Professor John
Bronsteen concludes, after surveying the credible research regarding
human behavior over the past twenty-five years: "[S]ince 1984,
substantial empirical evidence has emerged to support the view that
human beings in general, and parties to litigation in particular, care not
just about money but also about fairness."1 20 As Professor Bronsteen
also reports, the most recent and credible psychological research in
hedonics shows that humans are motivated not by rational wealth-
maximization, but by the desire to experience happiness.121 Persons
116. Id. at 526.
117. Id. Behavioral scholars even document the phenomenon that emotion can have on
economic transactions even if the emotion arises from a prior, irrelevant situation. See generally
Baba Shiv et al.. Investment Behavior and the Negative Side of Emotion. in EXOTIC
PREFERENCES: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HUMAN MOTIVATION. supra note 109, at 613.,
613 (explaining the "dark side" of emotions and the role they play in self destructive behavior).
118. Martin A. Nowak et al.. Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCIENCE
1773, 1773 (2000).
119. George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 139 (1993).
120. John Bronsteen. Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1129, 1138 (2009).
121. Bronsteen, supra note 120, at 1140. Hedonic psychology has contributed two major
findings to human behavior: First, hedonic psychology posits that persons adapt amazingly
quickly to change and that many positive and negative life experiences have little long-term effect
on well-being; rather, people undergo hedonic adaptation and their levels of happiness returns to
pre-event levels of well-being. John Bronsteen, et al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of
Civil Lawsuits. 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516. 1517. 1528 (2008): John Bronsteen et al., Happiness
and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (2009). Second, hedonic psychology also finds
that people do a surprisingly poor job of predicting the intensity and duration of future feelings, a
concept called affective forecasting. Bronsteen. Hedonic Adaptation. supra. at 1531-32: see also
Bronsteen, Happiness and Punishment, supra, at 1040 (noting that studies show people often
overestimate both the size and length of hedonic experiences).
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experience a great deal of well-being when they treat others with
fairness and dignity, and when they make decisions that result in their
being treated by others with fairness and dignity.122
B. The Research Challenging the Presumption of Rationality
Undermines the Use of that Presumption in Antitrust Cases
The presumption that persons and businesses are rational wealth-
maximizers that has led the courts to find antitrust claims implausible
has been specifically undermined in the antitrust context itself. In
Zenith, the Supreme Court presumed that rational actors would not
engage in a predatory conspiracy because their short-term losses are
certain, while the possibility of recovering these losses with
monopolistic profits in the long-term is uncertain. 123  Yet, empirical
evidence demonstrates that organizations do in fact take on that risk,
and that predatory-pricing agreements do in fact exist. 124
C. The Research Challenging the Presumption ofRationality
Undermines the Use of that Presumption in Discrimination Cases
The judicial presumption of rational wealth-maximizing behavior
also has been significantly undermined in the specific context of claims
122. BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER. HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS: HOW THE ECONOMY
AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT WELL-BEING 143. 149-150 (2002).
123. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595 (1986).
124. See Stucke, supra note 53, at 517 (describing how corporate behavior in the antitrust
context is not consistent with the presumption of rationality). See generally KURT EICHENWALD,
THE INFORMANT (2000) (detailing the massive lysine price-fixing conspiracy of Archer Daniel
Midlands in the 1990s); WILLIAM L. GREENE ET AL., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH
No. 22, PREDATORY PRICING 44 (1996) (discussing when predatory pricing can be successful);
Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy. 88 GEO. L.J. 2239
(2000). For examples of price fixing, see generally Execs Admit Guilt in Auto Parts Price-fixing
Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 24, 2011, available at http://www.boston.com/cars/news/articles/
2011/10/24/execsadmit guilt in auto partsprice fixing case/ (discussing price-fixing
agreement between two Japanese auto-parts manufacturers); Samsung Is Guilty in Price-Fixing
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/01 /business/0 samsung.html
(memory-chip manufacturer pleads guilty to price-fixing) De Beers Pleads Guilty in Price Fixing
Case, MSNBC (July 13, 2004), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5431319/ns/business-
world business/t/de-beers-pleads-guilty-price-fixing-case/ (diamond seller pleads guilty to price
fixing); Signapore Airlines Pleas Guilty to Price-Fixing, J. COM. (July 4, 2011).
http://wwwjoc.com/international-air/singapore-airlines-pleas-price-fixing (airline pleads guilty to
price fixing). For examples of companies convicted of predatory pricing, see generally George
White, Wal-Mart Guilty of Predatory Price Cutting, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 13, 1993).
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-10-13/business/fi-45290predatory-pricing (noting that Wal-Mart
was convicted of predatory pricing); National Stock Exchange Found Guilty of Predatory
Pricing, INT'L LAW OFFICE (Sept. 29. 2011). http://www.internationallawoffice.com/
newsletters/detail.aspx?g=3b6cfl5b-4234-497f-9462-fale3678427a (National Stock Exchange
found guilty of predatory pricing).
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involving intentional discrimination based on characteristics such as
race, gender, religion, age, and national origin. The presumption
induces courts to assume that these acts of intentional discrimination do
not occur because they are irrational. Persons or businesses who make
employment decisions because of characteristics such as race, for
example, act irrationally because the racial composition of an employee
is irrelevant to wealth-maximization. According to the logic of the
presumption, rational wealth-maximizing entities do not engage in
racial discrimination; in fact, if they do make decisions based on the
racial composition of their employee rather than the quality of their
work, then they will be punished for them in the marketplace.
The assumption that intentional discrimination is unlikely because it
is irrational, however, is flawed because rationality is bounded,
willpower is bounded, and self-interest is bounded. Choices are made
based upon characteristics such as race and gender, no matter how
irrational they may seem. In fact, the evidence indicates that employers
not infrequently make employment decisions based on characteristics
that are unrelated to the ability of an employee to maximize the wealth
of the business.125 As Professor Stein concludes, the assumption that
employers do not discriminate but act only in a rational, profit-
maximizing way is "empirically invalid."l 26 To the contrary, employers
commonly act on implicit biases against employees because of
characteristics like race. 127
Moreover, the market does not in fact consistently punish or sanction
employers who make such presumably irrational decisions. There is no
empirical support for the related assumption that market forces will
punish and eradicate employers who in fact make employment decisions
based on irrational factors, like disability, race, or gender.128 Professor
Stein concludes: "[Clontrary to the neoclassical labor market account,
empirical studies . . . demonstrate the persistence of employment
discrimination."l 29 The notion that discriminatory businesses would be
driven from the market by their nondiscriminatory competitors cannot
125. See, e.g., IAN AYERS, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? (2001); Cass R. Sunstein. Why Markets
Don't Stop Discrimination. in REASSESSING CIVIL RIGHTS 22, 36 (Ellen Frankel Paul ed.. 1991).
126. Stein, supra note 77, at 128.
127. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, I
HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 477, 485-86 (2007) (discussing how evidence of experimental
psychology demonstrates bias).
128. Stein, supra note 77, at 128 29 nn.321 26.
129. Id. at 127.
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be sustained in the wake of the evidence of persistent discrimination in
the labor markets.1 30
The persistence of irrational, even subconscious biases is even
confirmed by a recent study of judicial attitudes toward minority
litigants.131 First, the study finds that African-American plaintiffs are
2.66 times more likely to have their claims dismissed under Twombly
and Iqbal than they were under the Supreme Court's prior Conley v.
Gibson1 32 "no set of facts" pleading standard. 133  Second, the study
finds that African-American pro se plaintiffs are 2.10 times more likely
to have their claims dismissed than other pro se plaintiffs after the
Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard. 134  Last, the study finds that after
Iqbal and Twombly, Caucasian judges dismiss African-American
plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination at a higher rate (57.5%) than
African-American judges (33.3%).135 These findings, the study
concludes, suggest that district judges, without the opportunity to
consider live testimony at trial, rely on presumptions, stereotypes, and
implicit associations about race and discrimination that often turn out to
be wrong when deciding actual claims.1 36
D. The Research Challenging the Presumption of Rationality
Undermines the Use of that Presumption in Securities Cases
The presumption of rationality also has been undercut in cases
involving securities fraud. First, the rationality of individual directors,
officers, and other executives is bounded. Professor Donald C.
Langevoort observes:
[Even the] modern transaction-cost economics on which most
contemporary corporate scholarship is based concedes that the
rationality of officers, directors, and other managers is 'bounded' (that
is, that they do not have perfect information or unlimited time, skill,
and attention) and acknowledges that these agents have self-interests
that differ from those of their firms' owners.1
130. Id. at 128-29 nn.321-26.
131. Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of lqbal's
Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011).
132. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
133. Quintanilla, supra note 131, at 41.
134. Id. at 43. Another study likewise found that the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted
in all cases brought by pro se plaintiffs grew from Conley (67%) to Bell Atlantic (69%) to Iqbal
(85%). Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 615 (2010).
135. Quintanilla, supra note 131, at 44.
136. Id. at 23-24.
137. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
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For example, behavioral analysis teaches that persons-including
corporate executives, officers, and directors-suffer from several biases
that may set the stage for misleading investors including: (1) over-
optimism: a systemic overrating of their abilities and contributions,
resulting in inflated sense of ability to control events and risk; (2) path-
dependence: managers are overcommitted to decisions already made
and may ignore or discount new information that contradicts earlier
beliefs; and (3) the sunk-cost fallacy: managers may incrementally
make good faith (but overly optimistic) decisions that cause harm to the
firm once an unexpected event occurs. 138
Second, rationality is bounded by context, and the rationality of
management in particular is bounded by the regulatory context
established by the securities laws. The regulatory context of the
securities laws may encourage deception in two ways. First, if the risk
of legal liability or sanction under the securities is de minimis, then
persons may be primed to commit fraud. Indeed, even under the pure
rationality model, where the benefit from false disclosures outweighs
the risk of sanctions, securities fraud becomes perfectly rational.139 The
judiciary and Congress have erected a number of access barriers that
diminish the threat of legal liability or sanction under the securities
laws. 140 Thus, as the risk of sanction becomes de minimis, the choice to
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), in BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS. supra note 112. at 144, 144. He also calls managerial rationality "a holy grail
[rather] than as an observable reality." Id. at 145.
138. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate
Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 4. 5-7 (2003): Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics. 88
CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1091 93 (2000); William H. Starbuck, Congealing Oil: Inventing
Ideologies to Justify Acting Ideologies Out. 19 J. MGMT. STUD. 3. 8 (1982) (describing studies
that show that managers depart substantially from the rational-human model).
139. See, e.g., Daniel T. Ostas, When Fraud Pays: Executive Self Dealing and the Failure of
Self-Restraint, 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 571, 574, 601 (2007) (stating "[t]raditional economic analysis
assumes that people, including corporate executives, are motivated by pecuniary, or material.
self-interest" and finding that fraud can be rational, wealth-maximizing behavior when the
expected payout of the fraud is greater than the deterrent force of the law). Professors Jennifer
Arlen and William Carney also find that open-market lies are predictable if managers face a "last
period problem" where managers the disclosure of the truth would cause the company to go
bankrupt and cost the managers their jobs. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious
Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691. 724-
27.
140. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 92, at 56. Under the law of loss causation, for
example, it may be optimal for companies subject to the federal securities laws to obscure or
delay negative information in order to maximize investor welfare. Companies can control the
timing of their disclosures in order to enable them to manipulate the extent to which the
company's stock price reacts to new information. And thus, for companies with multiple
projects, companies can over-represent their value and minimize the consequences of fraud by
offsetting fraud in one project with success in another. Patrick J. Coughlin et al., What's Brewing
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engage in lucrative fraud becomes rational, and ironically, the judicial
presumption that securities fraud is irrational, which leads to a reduced
risk of sanctions by the courts, in turn actually makes securities fraud
more likely (more rational) because the financial benefits from the fraud
further outweigh the lessened risk of sanctions. Second, if fraud is
rational, that is, the risk of reward outweighs the risk of sanction, then
corporate officers may choose to pursue fraudulent actions to keep with
their fiduciary duties. Indeed, the idea that fraud may be rational,
wealth-maximizing behavior is what causes Professors Jonathan R.
Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller to argue that, at times, fraud is even
consistent with executives' fiduciary duties. 14 1
Third, behavioral analysis finds that contrary to the rationality
presumption for firms, even firms themselves can generate belief
systems that are the source of possible corporate misrepresentations
about its risks and future prospects. Using behavioral science and
institutionalist theory, Professor Langevoort explains that corporate
cultures can actually determine what individual actors prefer and how
they make sense of what is happening. 142 If a corporate culture is
characterized by over-optimism, illusions of control, and other self-
serving biases, then these biases can come to control a company's belief
system and then the tendency to underestimate or rationalize risk in
preparing publicity and disclosure will be exacerbated. 143
in Dura v. Broudo? A Review of the Supreme Court's Opinion and its Import for Securities Fraud
Litigation, 37 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 1, 26 (2005). And for single-project companies, requiring
plaintiffs to pinpoint a post-transaction decline and to attribute that decline to only the fraud
encourages companies to create intervening causes and commingle revelation of the fraud with
other bad news or even fabricate other news to mask the effect of the revelation of the fraud.
James C. Spindler. Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs To Lie More After Dura
Pharmaceuticals, 95 GEO. L.J. 653, 680-85 (2007).
141. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of
the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059. 1060 (1990).
142. Langevoort. supra note 137, at 145.
143. Id. at 150. The federal courts presume that fraud on the part of an independent auditor is
economically irrational, and thus pleading scienter is "exceedingly difficult." Reiger v. Price
Waterhouse Coopers, LLP, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (S.D. Cal. 2000). For example, when a
plaintiff sues an independent auditor for violating Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. the courts have
noted that it is almost always more difficult to establish scienter because the courts have
concluded that a "large independent accounting will rarely, if ever, have any rational economic
incentive to participate in its client's fraud." Id. at 1007; see also Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d
1097, 1102 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court opinion that there was not sufficient facts
to show the company's participating in fraudulent auditing). Rather, according to Chief Judge
Frank H. Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, "An accountant's greatest asset is its honesty.
followed closely by its reputation for careful work. Fees for two years' audits could not approach
the losses [the defendant] would suffer from a perception that it would muffle a client's fraud."
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624. 629 (7th Cir. 1990). Professor Robert Prentice. relying
on insights from behavioral psychology, completely debunks this idea. See Robert A. Prentice,
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V. THE PROBLEMATIC MODEL OF RATIONAL WEALTH-MAXIMIZATION
HAS PERMEATED THE SCHOLARSHIP REGARDING THE ROLE OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN CIVIL LITIGATION
The presumption of rationality that informs much of the scholarship
regarding pre-trial adjudication has also been questioned by social
science research. 144 Scholars and judges typically assess procedural
devices by their utility, particularly their propensity to maximize the
wealth of private parties by decreasing the cost of litigation and
hastening dispute resolution through settlement. 145  In seriously
examining the trilogy and summary judgment, scholars have employed
the same framework. The academy tends to debate summary judgment
under the shared presumption that its worth must be measured only by
its utility in reducing the cost of resolving disputes-in maximizing the
wealth of the private parties.146
The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw.
U. L. REV. 133, 135 (2000). He writes that (1) auditors themselves are boundedly rational, id. at
145 79, and have bounded willpower, id at 179 81; (2) auditing firms are not always rational
actors. id. at 184-86: and (3) reckless or fraudulent audits may at times be rational. id. at 145-81.
184 217.
144. For an excellent analysis of the spectrum of summary judgment scholarship, see Brooke
D. Coleman. Summary Judgment: What We Think We Know Versus What We Ought to Know. 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 705, 705-06 (2012).
145. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 401 (1973) (using economic theory to determine how to
resolve legal disputes): George L. Priest. Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An
Economic Analysis, I SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 163, 163-64 (1982) (analyzing the contradictory
nature of regulating the volume of litigation and encouraging litigation); Steven Shavell, Suit,
Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of
Legal Costs, II J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 55 (1982) (discussing four ways to allocate legal costs). For
example, the Chicago School has greatly affected the law surrounding pleadings. See, e.g.,
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 53-54 (2010) (arguing that heightened pleading under Twombly and
lqbal are motivated out of concerns of decreasing costs for defendants at the pleading stage); Suja
A. Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 633, 634 (2010) (stating there is no working
definition for "frivolous" and cataloguing the different heightened pleadings standards and stating
that they stem from a desire to save defendants the cost of litigating frivolous cases); John M.
Wunderlich, Note. Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd.: The Weighing Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 613, 651-79 (2008) (arguing that heightened pleading under the PLSRA and Tellabs is
motivated by a desire to spare defendants cost of litigation but neglects vital role of discovery and
Seventh Amendment concerns). In addition, the Chicago School has influenced the law
surrounding class certification. Judges, convinced that class actions impose too great a cost on
defendants, have erected merits barriers to class certification to balance the scale but they neglect
the considerable benefit discovery and trial have for society. See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman &
John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials in
Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 354 381 (2010) (arguing that class-
certification merits trials neglect the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury and the
considerable role discovery plays in enforcing the securities laws).
146. See, e.g., Jonathan Molot, An Old Judgment Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE
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Professor Bronsteen, however, insightfully shows that private parties
in litigation do not make decisions solely or primarily to maximize their
wealth. 147 Rather, as Prospect Theory shows, their decisions regarding
dispute resolution must be framed. 148 Plaintiffs are more willing to take
risks than defendants in the context of dispute resolution and
settlement. 149 Plaintiffs seek benefits from litigation. Defendants try to
avoid losses. Accordingly, defendants are more risk-averse than
plaintiffs, and hence plaintiffs will accept a settlement that is lower than
would be true if the parties only engaged in rational wealth-
maximization.
The lessons of game theory have precise application in the context of
settlement as well. 150  The parties make decisions to settle or to
continue to litigate based on their perceptions of fairness. They will
reject a value-maximizing settlement they deem to be unfair. 151
Similarly, hedonics research suggests that parties will make litigation
decisions to maximize their well-being rather than their net wealth. 152
The social science research, therefore, calls into question the rational
wealth-maximization model of civil litigation.
The research supports Professor Owen Fiss's prescient challenge to
that model, which he offered just before Zenith. In 1984, as the
Chicago School ascended, Professor Fiss wrote Against Settlement in
the Yale Law Journal. 153 In that article, Professor Fiss pushed against
the coming trend of the law-and-economics view of trials as a dead
weight loss154 that the parties would avoid through settlement if they
L.J. 27, 44, 91 (2003) (explaining that summary judgment is "less dangerous" if the goal is to
ensure that settlements are fair); D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary
Judgment. 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875. 892 (2006). Prominent members of the judiciary likewise
view summary judgment in terms of wealth-maximization for private parties. See, e.g.. Spellman
v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 148, 152 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) ("When it is plain that a trial
could have but one outcome, summary judgment is properly granted to spare the parties and the
court the time, the bother, the expense. the tedium, the pain, and the uncertainties of trial.").
147. Bronsteen, supra note 120, at 108-13.
148. Id. at 109.
149. Id. at 110 (citing Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996)).
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Comparison of Experimental Results, II J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 417, 447 (1990);
Martin A. Nowak et al., Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCIENCE 1773,
1773 (2000)).
152. Id. at 111-12; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger. Hedonic Damages,
Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 746 (2007) (discussing adapting the
circumstances based on adaptive preferences): Cass R. Sunstein. Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL
STUD. S 157, S157-S158 (2008) (explaining how people adapt to adverse conditions).
153. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
154. William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 62 (1971)
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only acted rationally.155 Professor Fiss reminds us that: (1) because
parties have different levels of resources, a settlement does not always
maximize the wealth of all parties; and (2) more importantly, that trials
also benefit community members apart from the private parties involved
in the litigation-i.e., they articulate and refine the law in a way that
creates public standards that may reduce future wrongdoing.1 56 To
presume that the civil jury system serves only private, utilitarian,
wealth-maximizing persons is incomplete. The civil jury system
performs a dual role, including public articulation of the law. 157
Accordingly, the role of summary judgment since the trilogy must be
assessed not merely by its utility in maximizing the wealth of the
private parties, but also by its capacity to shape legal standards in a
process deemed by that community to be dignified and fair.
By those criteria the Supreme Court's approach to the resolution of
civil disputes through summary judgment erected in Zenith is wanting.
As Professor Bronsteen has shown, if summary judgment were not as
common, the courts would produce a greater number of opinions that
clearly and objectively articulate legal standards for the community.158
By removing quintessential fact questions regarding human credibility
and intent from the jury, the judicial reliance on the rationality
presumption also threatens a community's perception that the dispute
was fairly resolved. 159
(describing trial as an anomaly and a deadweight loss).
155. See Bronsteen, supra note 120, at 102 (discussing Fiss's work).
156. Fiss, supra note 153, at 1076-78, 1085-87.
157. Bronsteen, supra note 120. at 108.
158. Id. at 104.
159. We are still discovering the jury trial's many functions and uses. For example, Professor
Cass Sunstein contends that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury ensures citizenship by
preserving an active role for citizens in the administration of both civil and criminal justice.
CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 113 (2004). Similarly. Professor Ellen Sward
notes that the civil jury actually serves four functions: First, the jury has a dispute-settling role,
acting as an equalizer among citizens and leveling inappropriate influence. Second, the jury has a
law-making role, in which it can achieve an indirect regulatory effect through jury nullification.
Third, the jury has a political role, as it protects the person from the tyranny of the government.
Fourth, the jury has a socializing role, in that it encourages diverse involvement. ELLEN E.
SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 23-65 (2001). In his compelling book, Professor
Robert Burns argues that the civil jury trial combines political purpose, legal structure, and moral
sensibility under "the discipline of the evidence" and hence is "the central institution of law as we
know it." See generally ROBERT P. BuRNs. THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (2009)
(discussing the history of trials in America and how they are dying out).
2012] 623
HeinOnline  -- 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 623 2011-2012
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Zenith has empowered federal
judges to prejudge factual issues by presuming that human beings
engage in rational wealth-maximizing behavior. That presumption,
which has become pervasive throughout the pre-trial adjudication
process, is inconsistent with the overwhelming weight of social science
research and empirical evidence amassed since Zenith. Nonetheless, the
profound and problematic judicial-certainty bias in favor of rationality
has led courts to grant summary judgment in situations where the
plaintiffs can present only circumstantial evidence of conduct, which
those courts presume to be irrational. Courts thus refuse to allow the
fact-finder to infer that a defendant engaged in irrational behavior from
circumstantial evidence. In other words, judges refuse to construe the
evidence presented on summary judgment in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving plaintiff, and they refuse to resolve inferences from that
evidence in favor of the nonmoving plaintiff.
As such, the remedy for this deeply flawed judicial predetermination
of factual questions is quite simple. Even as it altered the landscape of
summary judgment, the Supreme Court in its trilogy made absolutely
clear that federal judges must construe all the evidence presented on
summary judgment in favor of the nonmoving party and must resolve
inferences from that evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.160
Moreover, in Anderson, the Court went out of its way to remind federal
judges not to use summary judgment in a way that would take from the
jury its quintessential function of resolving credibility issues, weighing
competing evidence, and drawing legitimate inferences.161 When
federal courts conclude that irrational conduct cannot be inferred from
circumstantial evidence, they fly in the face of the Court's own
admonitions. They do not, as they must, view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs. They do not, as they must, resolve
inferences from the evidence in favor of the plaintiff. They do not, as
they must, confine fundamental issues of human behavior and
credibility to the jury.
By simply taking the Supreme Court's own cautionary language
seriously, the federal courts would be precluded from granting summary
judgment when the plaintiff presents circumstantial evidence of an illicit
motive. In doing so, the courts would free themselves from the
160. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317. 330 n.2 (1986) (Brennan. J.. dissenting)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 253-54 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
161. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 253-54.
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temptation to pre-judge cases based on the profound, pervasive, and
problematic presumption that humans invariably engage in rational,
wealth-maximizing behaviors. They would thereby also be freed from
the temptation to treat human beings as abstractions.
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